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Vertical Contracts Between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference With Limited Data-The Case of Yogurt

Villas-Boas, Sofia

from ARE Update Vol. 8, No. 2, Nov/Dec, 2004

View Article PDF: Vertical Contracts Between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference With Limited Data-The Case of Yogurt

Abstract

Rarely do firms sell their products directly to final consumers, instead selling through intermediary firms along a
vertical supply chain. Vertical contracts between upstream firms (such as manufacturers) and downstream firms (such as retailers) involve negotiations about wholesale prices and other contractual terms that researchers and policy makers do not observe. This paper introduces a framework for determining which vertical contract best fits the data for certain retailers and manufacturers. In particular, we analyze the yogurt market in the United States.

Keywords

manufacturer, retailer, consumer, upstream, downstream, vertical, marginalization, monopoly, yogurt

Citation

Villas-Boas, Sofia. 2004. "Vertical Contracts Between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference With Limited Data-The Case of Yogurt." ARE Update 8(2): 5-7. University of California Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics.
https://giannini.ucop.edu/filer/file/1453327736/16683/