Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Are They Really Magic Bullets?

de Janvry, Alain and Elisabeth Sadoulet

from ARE Update Vol. 7, No. 6, July/Aug, 2004

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Abstract

Conditional cash transfer programs pay recipients in exchange for an action that brings private behavior closer to the social optimum. We analyze one such program in Mexico, Progresa, that pays four million poor mothers to send their children to school and health visits. We show that these programs are effective, but that they can be made more efficient by following simple rules in selecting beneficiaries and calibrating transfers for maximum response per unit of transfer.

Keywords

conditional cash transfer, market, price, supply, efficiency, externality

Citation

de Janvry, Alain and Elisabeth Sadoulet. "Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Are They Really Magic Bullets?" ARE Update 7(6)(2004):9-11. University of California Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics.
http://giannini.ucop.edu/publications/are-update/issues/2004/7/6/conditional-cash-transfer/